BREAKING WINDOWS:
Situating the New Criminology

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> "At the end of the day, the book should be judged not so much as an academic discourse but as a political brick that was hurled through the windows of various establishments that had it coming to them." (Colin Sumner, The Sociology of Deviance: An Obituary, 1994, p284)

> "The retreat from theory is over, and the politicization of crime and criminology is imminent. Close reading of the classical social theorists reveals a basic agreement; the abolition of crime is possible under certain social arrangements ...

> "It should be clear that a criminology which is not normatively committed to the abolition of inequalities of wealth and power, and in particular inequalities in property and life chances [is] irreducibly bound up with the identification of deviance with pathology ... for crime to be abolished these social arrangements themselves must be subject to fundamental social change ...

> "The task is not merely to 'penetrate' these problems, not merely to question the stereotypes, not merely to act as carriers of 'alternative phenomenological realities'. The task is to create a society in which the facts of human diversity, whether personal, organic or social, are not subject to the power to criminalize." (Ian Taylor, Paul Walton, Jock Young, The New Criminology, 1973, pp281-2)

Eric Hobsbawm, in The Age of Extremes, pinpoints the extraordinary changes which occurred in the last third of the Twentieth Century. The Golden Age of post-war Europe and North America was a world of full employment and steadily rising affluence, it witnessed the gradual incorporation of the working class into, at least the trappings, of full citizenship, the entry of women more fully into public life and the labour market, the attempt in the United States to create political equality for African Americans. It was an era of inclusion, of affluence and of conformity. But, as Hobsbawm wryly delineates, the Golden Age was followed by the cultural Revolution of the late Sixties and Seventies, with

the rise of individualism, of diversity, of a vast, wide scale deconstruction of accepted values. A world of seeming certainty was replaced by one of pluralism, debate, controversy and ambiguity. And, whereas social commentators of the early Sixties had bemoaned the conformity of the age, the subsequent years experienced widespread disorder, rebellion and rising crime, despite the continuing increase in average incomes and the most committed attempts to socially engineer a satisfied and orderly society. It was a world where commentators of all political persuasions talk of *'the compass'* failing, where each of the certain keystones of society: the family, work, the nation and even affluence itself, became questioned and unobvious.

The world of criminology was touched by these upheavals as was each sub-discipline of the social sciences but, perhaps more so, occupying as it does the crossroads of order and disorder, of law and morality. Indeed in many ways the sudden outburst of intellectual output occurring in the period 1968-1975 can be seen not so much as a series of academic *'breakthroughs'* occurring within the interior world of academic debate, as strident signals of the change into late modernity occurring in the world surrounding the academy. For it is at times of change that fundamental revisions of academic orthodoxy occur. Thus it is no accident that three books written at the same time, but from differing political perspectives, David Matza's Becoming Deviant (1969); James Q Wilson's Thinking About Crime (1975) and The New Criminology (1973) not only are revisionist, in the sense of looking back in a unique and re-appraising fashion, but also share the same themes. Thus all concerned with diversity, all are vehemently critical of positivism and all cast doubt on the metanarrative of progress whether through social engineering or the criminal justice system.

But let us look at the specific intellectual context of The New Criminology; this was, as the acknowledgements indicate: "fundamentally the product of discussions and developments in and around the National

Deviancy Conference" (p.xv).

The NDC was, in the words of one author, the site of an *'explosion'* of work, the *'fall out'* of which was to change the terrain of criminology and the sociology of deviancy for many years to come. One gauge of this explosion would be that in the first five year period from the inception of the NDC in 1968 to 1973, there were sixty-three speakers from Britain who produced between them just under one hundred books on crime, deviance and social control.[(1)] The impact, moreover, was scarcely limited to crime and deviance, for example, early work in gender studies were presented (including Mary McIntosh and Ken Plummer) and the first flourishes of what was to become cultural studies (including Dick Hebdidge, Mike Featherstone, Stuart Hall and Paul Willis). The basis of such work and the widespread interest it generated (there were ten national conferences in the four years 1969 to 1972) undoubtedly the first airing of what was to be known as 'post-modern' themes. As Stan Cohen (this volume) put it, "After the middle of the Nineteen Sixties - well before Foucault made these subjects intellectually respectable and a long way from the Left Bank - our little corner of the human sciences was seized by a deconstructionist impulse". Indeed the arrival of Discipline and Punish in English translation in 1977 was scarcely a revelation, the themes and concepts of Foucault were already well rehearsed, the door was wide open to deconstructionism.

For the Conference was deconstructionist to a person, anti-essentialist in its stance, it evoked a myriad voices and viewpoints right to the edge of relativism, it dwelt on the social construction of gender, sexual proclivity, crime, suicide, drugs and mental state. It inverted hierarchies, it read total cultures from the demi-monde of mods, rockers, teddy boys, hippies, skinheads - it traced the bricolage of the old culture by which the new *'spectacular'* youth cultures constituted themselves, it focused on their media representatives and the fashion in which media stereotypes shaped and at times became reality. And beneath all of this was an underlay of

critique of both strands of State intervention: positivism and classicism. For the twin meta-narratives of progress: social engineering and the rule of law, where consistently subject to criticism. Positivism was perhaps the main enemy: its ontology was seen to take human creativity out of deviant action, its sociology erected a consensual edifice from which deviants were bereft of culture and meaning, its methodology elevated experts to the role of fake scientists discovering the *'laws'* of social action and its policy, whether in the mental hospitals, the social work agencies or the drug clinics, was self-fulfilling and mystifying. But the rule of law also came under close scrutiny. The NDC was concerned how the criminal justice system was selective and ineffective. That is how crime occurred endemically yet the justice system focused on the working class and on youth. Crimes of the powerful were ignored: middle class deviancy tolerated. And the prison itself was brutalising, scapegoating and ultimately counterproductive: two of the most blistering indictments of the prison system, Psychological Survival (Cohen and Taylor, 1976) and Prisoners in Revolt (Fitzgerald, 1977) springing out of this. But such irrationality in terms of social reaction to crime was not limited to the institutions of the State, but also to those of civil society. For the mass media were seen to select out deviant groups creating folk devils and engendering moral panics (see Cohen, 1972, Young, 1971).

Two influences from North American criminology were paramount: that of labelling theory and that of sub-culture theory. The first was most evident; the work of Becker, Lemert and Kitsuse was, after all, the precursor of 'post-modern' developments in criminology. The second was more obscured, it was a considerable presence throughout particularly in the work on youth sub-cultures, but its voice was muted (see Cohen, 1980, Downes and Rock, 1988) presumably because of its association with structural functionalism, the bête noire of radical sociology at that time.

From the neo-Chicagoans was gleaned a sense of diversity, of human

creativity thwarted by the labelling process, of selectivity and of the self-fulfilling prophecy as the essential *"master status"* of the label became accepted both by deviant and public alike. From Merton, Cloward and Ohlin, and Albert Cohen, came a sense of the total society, how the contradiction between fundamental values and the structure of society, generated crime and disorder. For deviance was endemic not only in the neo-Chicagoan sense of diversity but also in that it was ultimately related to the central values and structures of the social order. Further, that sub-cultures were attempts to resolve such contradictions. From both of these traditions came a two-fold sense of irony: the irony that the core values and material basis of society generates crime and the way that social attempts to tackle these problems exacerbates the very problems it sets out to solve. That irrationality dwells both at the core of the social order and in its attempts to maintain equilibrium.

These twin strands of North American criminology became transposed and woven together in British deviancy theory. Transposed in that they were shifted to a society which was more aware of relationships of class and transfixed, at that time, with the emergence of ebullient and dynamic youth cultures. Thus class and youth became the major social areas around which the work pivoted (gender was to come a little later and race/ethnicity to wait until the Nineteen Eighties). Woven, in that both strands, which in American criminology were separate and antagonistic, were brought together. In a way this was only logical because both were complementary. The great contribution of labelling theory was its unpacking of the dyadic nature of crime and deviance. Deviancy was not a quality inherent in an act it is a quality bestowed upon an act. To have deviance one needs action and reaction, behaviour and evaluation, rule making and rule breaking. Yet having said this labelling theorists, as did the social constructionists who followed them, tended to bracket off action from reaction and concentrate on the latter and its impact. They were interested in social construction, human agency was never lost but became ephemeral and, somehow, existential. Sub-cultural theory, on the

other hand, was interested in the actual generation of behaviour; its weakness was the creation of rules, the other half of the equation. Yet even though it was able to chart the determinants of actors, the actions themselves were wooden. In Delinquent Boys (Cohen, 1955) they rather petulantly inverted middle class morality like spoilt automata reversing their programmes; in Delinquency and Opportunity (Cloward and Ohlin, 1960) they went through a series of pre-programmed options like bearings in a pinball machine. The task of British theorisation was to try to bring these three concepts together: to deal with action and reaction, to postulate human actors who were neither capriciously free-willed nor stolidly determined, to place actors both in a micro-setting and in the context of the wider society.

Finally, both theories had distinct limitations with regards to the macro-level of analysis. Labelling theory, in particular, was concerned very fruitfully with the immediate interaction between the actor and the labelling process, but it had little theory of the total society outside of the clash or disparate interest groups and moral entrepreneurs. Sub-cultural theory was excellent in terms of its sense of contradiction between structure and culture on a macro-level, but it had little sense of what were the dynamics of society as a whole (see L Taylor, 1971, p148).

It was this task of synthesis which confronted the radical criminologists who grouped around the NDC and it was these tasks which shaped the structure and discourse of The New Criminology. But before we turn to the questions which such debates engendered, let us look briefly at one area of work in which the NDC was greatly involved, for it is these exploratory tasks which were the laboratory within which the framework of The New Criminology was developed. I have talked about transposing American theorisation onto the current British preoccupations with class and youth. It was, in fact, the combination of class and youth which was a major focus of the NDC. Thus we have papers on football hooliganism and working class youth (Ian Taylor, 1968), on student, middle class drug-taking (Jock Young, 1968), on hippies (Stuart Hall, 1970), Phil

Cohen's path-breaking paper on working class youth cultures in 1970, Paul Walton on political protest and the student movement in 1971, Paul Willis on motor bike sub-cultures in 1972. And this was followed over the years by papers on youth culture by John Clarke, Mike Brake, Geoff Pearson, Geoff Mungham, Dick Hebdidge and Paul Corrigan.

What is clear from these various essays is that there is a very overt attempt to go beyond the wooden determined actors of American theorisation, to place them in a specific class position rather than invoke the notion of a universal youth culture (see Clarke et al, 1975) to place such cultures in particular local settings with a consciousness of space and change over time, and to stress the creativity of youth culture. For sub-cultures were seen as human creations, attempting to solve specific problems which were constantly re-written at each nook and cranny of society rather than centrally orchestrated scripts mechanically enacted by actors deterministically allocated to their position in the social structure. There is a lineage certainly between Albert Cohen and Paul Willis and between Cloward and Ohlin and Phil Cohen, but there is also a wealth of difference!

In this work there is a clear influence of the English socialist historians, such as Edward Thompson, Eric Hobsbawm, Christopher Hill and Sheila Rowbotham (see Downes and Rock, 1988; Cohen, 1980). That is, amongst other things, of *"writing from below"*, of history written from "the material experiences of the common people rather than from above in the committee chambers of high office" (Pearson, 1978, p119). Of revealing a world which, in the title of Sheila Rowbotham's book, was 'hidden from history' (1973). This re-writing of social history stressed localism and specificity,

> "the heterogeneity or complexity of working class culture fragmented not only by geographical unevenness and parochialism, but also by social and sexual divisions of labour and by a whole series of divisions into spheres of existence (including work and leisure)" (Johnson, 1979, p62).

The socialist historians of this period undoubtedly had an extraordinary influence on this second wave of sub-cultural theory presented at the NDC and developed particularly around the work of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham under the directorship of Stuart Hall. Here we have sub-cultures of imagination and creativity rather than of flatness and determinism, resistance rather than of negativism and retreatism, of a world of leisure as well as school and work, of meaning rather than malfunction. And just as socialist and feminist historians read from the activities and aspirations of lowly people the dynamics and ethos of the total society sub-culture becomes a text to be read and Popular culture is as relevant, perhaps more so, in understanding the total society, than high culture. Thus Phil Cohen's (1972) 'mods' and 'skinheads' tell us about urban dislocation, working class de-skilling, destruction of community; John Clarke and his colleagues' analysis of changing youth cultural forms relates to the wider processes of embourgeoisement, mass culture and affluence (1976), Paul Willis' lads intransigence and bloody mindedness becomes transformed to Pyrrhic resistance to wage labour and subordination (1977).

But it is not only deviant action which is given meaning in such a holistic fashion, it is the reaction against deviance. Here the other strand of North American theorisation, labelling theory, is reworked and transformed. For here, in exactly a parallel fashion, labelling theory became re-cast into moral panic theory. For if subcultural theory interprets the seemingly irrationality of delinquency in a rational fashion, moral panic theory offers the possibility of interpreting the seemingly ill thought out, gut reactions of authority and the wider public to deviance in a similar manner. That is, just as on a superficial level delinquent vandalism is negativistic and unproductive, yet at the same time becomes meaningful and understandable in a wider social context, so moral panics about crime, although disproportionate, wrongly conceptualised and even counterproductive, become understandable and *'reasonable'* in the light

of conflicts existing in the total society.

Of course, to say this does not mean that sub-cultural behaviour is tenable (see Matza, 1969) - it is frequently not; nor that moral panics are correct in their foundation - they are not by definition. Rather it is to stress that deviant action and the reaction against it is not mindless, non-rational behaviour, rather it is meaningful behaviour which involves mistakes in rationality (cf Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 1994). Thus the two early formulators of moral panic, Stan Cohen (1972) and Jock Young (1971) clearly indicate the deep-seated nature of the panic. For Cohen:

"The Mods and rockers symbolised something far more important than what they actually did. They reached the delicate and ambivalent nerves through which post-war social change in Britain was experienced. No one wanted depressions or austerity but messages about *'never having it so good'* were ambivalent in that some people were having it too good and too quickly ... Resentment and jealousy were easily directed against the young, if only because of their increased spending power and sexual freedom. When this was combined with a too-open flouting of the work and leisure ethic, with violence and vandalism ... something more than the image of a peaceful Bank Holiday at the sea was being shattered." (1972, p192)

And for Young the moral panic about a harmless drug, cannabis, and purposively harmless people, hippies, represented the reaction by the hardworking citizen against groups which disdained work and the ethos of productivity. If Cohen's scenario in the mid-Sixties represented a wider society coming to terms with the movement out of post-war austerity and the new affluence of the young, Young's scene of the late-Sixties represented the reaction of an affluent society used to hard work and incessant consumption to a possible world beyond scarcity where the rigours of work were no longer necessary and the pleasures of consumption no longer obvious. Thus, just as sub-cultures had to be read as a text, so moral panics must be read likewise. Furthermore, and this is of importance, each of these authors attempted to explain both youth cultures <u>and</u> moral panics and sought to do so within the <u>same</u> wider

context. Thus Cohen ends the first edition of Folk Devils and Moral Panics by a discussion of how Mods and rockers develop in the newly found affluence of the Sixties and, later on, because the book inevitably focussed more on moral panics than folk devils, the introduction of the second edition (1980) reversed the book's sequence and concentrated on action before reaction. And Young, in The Drugtakers (1971), sought to explain the development of bohemian youth cultures as well as the moral panic against drug use. The two strands of American theorisation, sub-cultural theory and labelling theory are thus brought together and developed. Lastly, both authors are concerned not only with action and reaction but with the impact of social reaction on the deviant actors. Thus Stan Cohen talks of how the punitive reaction of society increases and polarises the deviance of the youths and thus serves to confirm the original stereotypes and Young talks of 'the translation of fantasy into reality'. There is clearly here what Sumner, rather critically, calls "the interaction and deep interconnection between signifier (the discourse of punitive reaction) and signified (juvenile delinquency)" (1995, p263). The study of crime and deviance is of necessity dyadic, consisting of action and reaction, but the two parts of the dyad are, in the last analysis, inseparable: they give rise to one another and profoundly affect each other. It is not possible, therefore, to bracket off one from the other, yet this was the unwitting situation in American theorisation at that time. Indeed, contemporary social constructionism explicitly focuses only on the signifier and contemporary American interpretation of moral panic theory manages to lose, once again, the deviant phenomenon in their rendering of moral panic theory (eg Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 1995). I will return to this at the end of this essay.

The New Criminology: The Explanatory Agenda

It is out of this background that The New Criminology emerged. Thus the core agenda of the book elucidates the substantive and formal requirements of a fully social theory of deviance. Let us examine the

framework which formed the basis for the concluding chapter.

1. **Formal Requirements of Theory** (Scope)

An adequate theory must cover fully the evolution of the deviant act:

i) Wider Origins The underlying causes of the deviant act;

ii) Immediate Origins What is the immediate origin of the deviant act? e.g. problems faced by the individual or the group;

iii) Actual Act How does the behaviour relate to the causes? e.g. problem solving, relationship between culture of origins and emergent culture, rationality, individual, collective solution, etc.

iv) Immediate Origin of social Reaction;

v) Wider Origin of Social Reaction;

vi) Outcome of Social Reaction on Deviant's Further Action.

vii) Persistence and Change of Actions in terms of i) to vi).

2. **Substantive Requirements of Theory** (Substance)

i) Human beings as both determined and determining.

ii) A pluralistic diverse society.

iii) A class society based on inequalities of wealth and power.

iv) A sequential, processual model which is historical and open-ended.

v) A dialectic between structure and consciousness, i.e. it would relate typical sets of motives (consciousness and ideologies) to situated actions (given historical contexts).

vi) Holistic view of society and of the individual: the fully social conception of human action.

vii) Theory: must be isomorphic (i.e. symmetrical) - giving same explanations for social reaction and action, for the theorist and his object of study.

viii) Empirical Base: must both utilise and endeavour to

explain all types of deviancy.

ix) It must involve a criminology which is aware of history and the socio-historical position of the theorists; which will treat crime not as a technicality, a surface problem needing correction, but which deals with society as a totality.

There we have it: there is very little today that one would find fault in this. The emphasis on the symmetry of analysis of action - and reaction - is at the core of both approaches, as is the notion of locating such a process in the wider social structure. Time and process is seen as an essential part of the analysis and the implicit theoretical agenda involves a merger of subcultural and labelling theory. (See Young, 1974).

The programme calls for a criminology which is isomorphic, reflexive and which transcends the narrow boundaries of practical, 'jobbing' criminology (See Loader, this volume). Thus:

"We have argued here for a political economy of criminal action, and of the reaction it excites, and for a politically-informed social psychology of these ongoing social dynamics. We have, in other words, laid claim to have constructed the formal elements of a theory that would be adequate to move criminology out of its own imprisonment in artificially segregated specifics. We have attempted to bring the parts together again in order to form the whole." (Ibid, p279)

Further:

"A criminology which is to be adequate to an understanding of these developments, and which will be able to bring politics back into the discussion of what were previously technical issues, will need to deal with the society as a totality. This 'new' criminology will in fact be an *old* criminology, in that it will face the same problems that were faced by the classical social theorists." (Ibid, p278)

And further:

"The insulation of criminology from sociology in general - symbolized

institutionally in America in Robert Merton's insistence on placing the study of crime in the Department of Social Administration at Columbia - is rapidly being broken down. The 'social reaction theorists' in drawing attention to the activities of the rule-creators and enforcers ... have redirected criminological attention to the grand questions of social structure and the overweening social arrangements within which the criminal process is played out. We are confronted once again with the central question of man's relationship to structures of power, domination and authority - and the ability of men to confront these structures in acts of crime, deviance and dissent - we are back in the realm of social theory itself." (Ibid, p268)

Thus the basis of a 'transgressive' criminology which 'abandons criminology to sociology' demanded by Maureen Cain (1990) and Carol Smart (1990) in the Nineties was part and parcel of the everyday culture of those associated with the NDC in the late Sixties and early Seventies. They would have quickly warmed to Richard Ericson and Kevin Carriere's invocation that "the only viable academic sensibility is to encourage people to let their minds wander to travel intellectually across the boundaries and frontiers and perhaps never to return to them" (1994, p108). This being said, it is obvious that the philosophical and sociological debates which such an opening out would entail would differ today. The debate with post-modernity, although implicit in much of the early radical writing, is obviously centre place (See articles by Lea and Young in this volume) as is the need for engagement with feminist literature (witness the use of masculine pronouns in the last quote from The New Criminology) has become essential particularly given the incisive work of scholars such as Carol Patemen and Anne Phillips (See Kerry Carrington, this volume), and the pioneering research of second wave feminists in the areas of rape, domestic violence and sexual harassment (See Mooney, 1994).

Lastly, such a programme needs to be supplemented, as was suggested in the later volume, Critical Criminology, by a study of the victim-offender relationship, in contrast to conventional criminology, where: "The deviant is seen as propelled by his essential propensities into the

contemporary world - his victim being the first accidental social atom into which he collides". (I Taylor, P Walton, J Young, 1975, p66).

The Widening of the Empirical Base

An integral part of this programme was a widening of the empirical base: the solitary focus of much criminology on class needed to be supplemented by the empirical base of gender, ethnicity and age without either reducing one to another or losing one dimension or another altogether, as frequently occurs.

Thus early on in The New Criminology it was noted that:

"The predicament which arises [for positivism] is that crime is found to be well nigh ubiquitous. It is found to occur in all sections of society - amongst the rich and the poor, the young and the old - amongst men and women - and always in greater amounts and in different proportions than was previously assumed. Criminological theory, however, has largely worked on the assumption that crime is an overwhelmingly youthful, masculine, working class activity." (I Taylor, P Walton, J Young, 1973, p15).

This crucial premise of The New Criminology stresses that crime is not a marginal, exceptional phenomenon but something which is widespread in society. It cannot, therefore, be explained by positivist accounts which ascribe such behaviour to marginal and exceptional conditions. For such theories do not attempt to explain crime, rather they seek to explain it away. But if crime is endemic: criminalization is not. And here the critique of The New Criminology focuses not only on positivism but on classicism. For a central theme of the book is the problem of selectivity. That is the fact that many are called but few are chosen. Hence the radical impact of labelling theory was rephrased in the context of class. With this in mind the book systematically examines the varieties of criminological theory in terms of their ability to deal with the facts of class. This is the basis of its revisionism.

The class distribution of crime was, of course, obvious; it has been a commonplace of every criminology text written. The introduction of class into the analysis was in many ways the obverse of this, it was the recognition that crime occurred throughout the class structure but that criminalization was selectively focused upon the lower working class. It was less about the class distribution of crime and more about it being a function of class relations. Instead of crime being, so to speak, the result of 'lack of class', its cause was seen as a result of relationships of class and its criminalization itself, a relationship which displayed and perpetuated relationships of class.

It has frequently been pointed out that The New Criminology is silent on the gender distribution of crime and the implications of such a disproportionality on theories of crime in general (eg C Sumner, 1994). This criticism is certainly valid, although perhaps slightly unfair given that the impact of second wave feminism was to occur after The New Criminology was published. The most influential early text, Susan Brownmiller's Against Our Will was, for example, published in 1975. Such criticisms are, of course, easy with hindsight, but display as much insight as pointing out that Carol Smart's Women, Crime and Criminology (1976) is silent on the subject of class and indeed both texts are totally blind on race and ethnicity. The task of creating a criminology which incorporates gender, class, ethnicity and age is still in the making. Recent work, as Marina Rice nicely points out, "is extraordinarily partial in its focus". For example, "black criminology ... has focused on black men and feminist criminology ... [is] largely concerned with white women" (1990, p58). Indeed, it is only recently (1993) that James Messerschmidt, in Masculinities and Crime, has come near to bringing all four structural dimensions into play within a common theory.

Policing the Crisis: The Apotheosis of Radical Criminology

Attempts to carry out such a programme are few and far between. The structure is pre-figured in The Drugtakers (1971) and is utilized in Mike Brake's influential work on youth culture (1980) but, as Downes and Rock (1988, p24) indicate, by far the most complete expression of such an approach is the seminal text Policing the Crisis (Hall et al, 1978). This is not so much through any attempt to explicitly reproduce such a programme, although The New Criminology is clearly an influence, but rather - as I have argued - because such a comprehensive attempt to describe the wider and immediate origins of the deviant action and the reaction to it was part and parcel of the approach that developed around the NDC in these years. The book is extraordinary in that it unites concepts from deviancy theory (amplification, moral panic, control culture, signification) with those from Maxism (eg hegemony, relative autonomy, civil society, wage form). It moves in a gigantic U-curve starting from the actual act: a mugging in Handsworth, up on one hand, to the immediate reaction of 'the face to face control' of the 'police as amplifiers' to the social production of news by the mass media to the orchestration of moral panics, the mobilisation of public anxiety and the management of hegemony in a situation of economic crisis, to, on the other, the immediate causes of mugging which lie in the 'super-exploitation' of the black labour force, the rise of a culture of hustling and a rejection of degrading work, all of this within the context of the same economic crisis which produced the social reaction. Thus both sides of the equation are covered: there is no attempt to bracket off street crime from moral panic nor to allocate it to a world of dubious aetiological validity. There is, therefore, no denial of the reality of street crime, no pretence that such crime does not arise out of the economic predicament of the black youth, no denial of causality:

"The position of black labour, subordinated by the processes of capital, is deteriorating and will deteriorate more rapidly, according to its own

specific logic. Crime is one perfectly predictable and quite comprehensible consequence of this process - as certain a consequence of how the structures work ... as the fact that night follows day". (OpCit, p390)

The crime itself is, therefore, not bracketed off from the social reaction as if it were some independent entity. Indeed, the relationship between moral panic and the real crime problem is a key to the use of moral panic in order to maintain hegemony. Witness:

"*Certain kinds of crime* are a real, objective problem for working people trying to lead a normal and respectable life. If street crime rises, it will be primarily in *their* streets. They have a real stake in defending what little property and security they have managed to store up against the threat of poverty and unemployment. Crime threatens the limited range of cultural goods which make life worth living at all with a measure of self-respect. The demand that crime must be controlled - that people be free to walk about unmolested, that since the property of the wealthy and powerful is constantly and sophisticatedly protected there is no reason in the 'just society' why the property of the poor should be exposed to theft and vandalism - is not from this point of view an irrational one. This 'traditionalist' attitude to crime has its real, objective basis in the material situation and cultural position of the subordinate classes" (Ibid, p149)

"The concepts of 'state' and 'hegemony' appear, at first sight, to belong to different conceptual territory from that of the 'moral panic'. And part of our intention is certainly to situate the 'moral panic' as one of the forms of appearance of a more deep-seated historical crisis, and thereby to give it greater historical and theoretical specificity. ... One of the effects of retaining the notion of 'moral panic' is the penetration it provides into the otherwise extremely obscure means by which the working classes are drawn into processes which are occurring in large measure 'behind their backs' and led to experience and respond to contradictory developments in ways which make the operation of state power legitimate, credible and consensual. To put it crudely, 'moral panic' appears to us to be one of the principal forms of ideological consciousness by means of which a 'silent majority' is won over to the support of increasingly coercive measures on the part of the state, and lends its legitimacy to a 'more than usual' exercise of control." (Ibid, p221)

The moral panic's roots are in real problems occurring in society; its rational kernel is the means by which such consensual leverage can be exerted within the population. What is irrational about the moral panic

is not that it is a metaphor of social anxiety without roots but that it is incommensurate: that is it is disproportional (the anxiety is way out of proportion to the extent and changes in the size of the problem) and miscontextualised (mugging is equated as solely a problem of black youth rather than a problem of poor, working class young people who live in inner cities). (See Lea and Young, 1984)

The Signifier Not the Song: Some Errors of Social Constructionism

Colin Sumner in his recent exegesis of the period presents an interpretation sharply in contrast to the above. For him:

"Conceptually the NDC had no shared view, and made few theoretical advances beyond the position reached within American sociology." (1994, p262)

The work of Stan Cohen, for example, was

"not particularly conceptually innovative" (Ibid, p265)

For Sumner the innovation of the American deviancy theorists was that they had stumbled on the "fact" that signifiers of deviance and those signified were only contingently related. That is that although deviance is widespread, those selected to be labelled deviants, the content of the label itself and the reaction to control them is arbitrary and inappropriate. Delinquency, for example, occurs throughout the class structure, yet it is lower working class youth (particularly blacks) who are selected out to be deviant, who are labelled as pathological and who are reacted to in an over-punitive and counterproductive ways. All of this is true and of great significance and theoretical influence. But the conclusion drawn from this by theorists in this tradition (social constructionists, abolitionists and moral censure theorists) is that because of the contingent nature of the signifiers, the groups labelled delinquents, criminals, prostitutes etc. have

no ontological reality (See Hulsman, 1986). They are merely an arbitrary sample drawn from the population at the whim of the powerful. It makes no sense, therefore, to generalise about them or to devise aetiologies; rather what makes sense is to analyse and discover the causes of the labels, the moral censures themselves. After all, in this analysis, the phenomenon, the social problem, has little anthological validity: it is a creature created by caprice.

It is this position which Sumner readily embraces. Indeed he notes with some satisfaction that Howard Becker "even once used the term social censure", (Ibid, p233) "prefiguring" the basis of Sumner's own theory, which radically separates out the study of the label from those labelled. (See Sumner, 1990). His moral censure theory is, of course, an English variety of social constructionism (See Kitsuse and Spector, 1973; Pfohl, 1977) and shares with it the same strategy: to attempt to explain the social reaction against crime, deviance, or any other social problem by purposively bracketing off the phenomenon itself.

Such an approach attempts the impossible. It attempts to explain the social reaction against deviance separately from deviance itself, indeed it denies than an explanation of the actual phenomenon makes sense. This is the problem of partiality - of denying the holistic nature of phenomena (See Young, 1994) Needless to say it is impossible to explain, say, prostitution and the public reaction to it, burglary and the attempts at its control, domestic violence and the level of social disapproval, independently of one another. It is one thing to suggest that the social reaction, the signifier, is inappropriate, disproportionate and counterproductive with regards the deviant event, the signifier. It is completely another to suggest that there is no discrete problem out there, that there is no relationship between the signified event and the signification, and that the effect on the deviant actors or group is not predicated upon the actual nature of the deviance.

It is impossible to understand social reaction without understanding the action which is being reacted against, it is impossible to study signifiers without knowledge of the signified. To say that the powerful more often than not get the wrong end of the stick is not to suggest that the stick is somehow conjured out of thin air or is merely a projection of their fantasies, fears and interests. This was precisely the criticism of labelling theory made in The New Criminology (See pp139-71). Furthermore, to suggest that working class delinquents are differentially and unfairly picked upon by the criminal justice system is not to suggest that their subculture is not an entity in its own right, reflecting their deprivations and sense of injustice. Similarly, just because many women engage in prostitution does not mean that there is not something particular about street prostitution with its own aetiology, predicaments and structure. Thus, just because crime and prostitution are legal categories which cover a multitude of subcultures and activities does not mean that the section of the population deemed to be delinquents or prostitutes by the criminal justice system is arbitrary in its nature, however arbitrary the injustice which is brought to bear upon it.

To take the heterogeneous bunch of behaviours lumped together within a legal category as the unifying base of criminology is, of course, a nonsense. (See Carlen, 1992; Young, 1992) No causal theory could be based say on all prostitution, all theft, all drug use etc. It is necessary to talk about discrete crimes in specific social situations. The programme of The New Criminology talks of specific choices involving deviant solutions in differentially experienced situations (Ibid, p271). Furthermore, the definition of what is criminal depends on the interaction of social reaction and behaviour, it can never be a constant, a given, as is positivism.

Thus, not only is crime a variable which cannot be independently ascertained by either lawyer or positivist social scientist, but neither can the causes of crime conceivably be of a blanket nature; ie all crime

cannot be caused by poverty or unemployment or market individualism etc. And conversely to discover, for example, that all crime is not caused by poverty is not to eliminate poverty as a cause of some crime. This is a mistake stretching back to the work of Edwin Sutherland (1942); indeed it might be called Sutherland's Fallacy. Furthermore, to seek a unitary explanation of crime leads to bland abstractions of breathtaking lack of utility, such as that all crime is caused by human frailty or by being male or by differential association with the wicked.

To argue, therefore, that the law, the signifier of legality, creates heterogeneous categories of behaviour under its wing, is not to deny the possibility of aetiological theory nor is it to suggest that the focus of analysis should solely be on law itself. The danger, here, is that by the focusing on legal prohibitions, moral censure, moral panic, the social constructions of the powerful etc, the phenomenon itself becomes lost from sight. The signifier becomes of greater significance than the signified, representations of deviance occlude the deviants themselves, criminology collapses into cultural studies. This can be graphically seen if we look at Sumner's somewhat post-modern depictions of the present. For he notes that such a process of disconnection has growing validity. Its roots lie in the speed of change, the transformations wrought by modernity. Thus he writes of Stan Cohen's classic study of 'mods and rockers':

"As capital expands, speeds up ever faster, dissolves new technologies in favour of hyper-technology and converts us all into images with or without value in a rapidly de-materializing materialism, it may be that the Mod was at one and the same time the last stand of a coherent representation of the devil and the first form of an insubstantial flicker on a perpetual screen of daily denunciations in a world where the screen is more significant than the signifier signified.

"To Cohen's credit, his analysis enabled such thoughts, and indeed, I would say, through his particular focus on the mass media, provoked them. Something in the text suggests an inchoate forerunner of post-modernism, even though Cohen himself presented a coherent connection

between signifier and signified ...

"What was to follow in the 1970s in Europe began to disconnect signifier and signified, but Cohen, like Laing, had already begun to suggest that the relation between signifier and signified was 'fundamentally inappropriate'. Insanity seemed sane and sanity seemed lunatic. Deviance was being seen as at least as normal as normality and the latter looked very deviant indeed. The signifiers were becoming unhooked. They were being rendered as parodies of themselves. Reality was mocked up, and mock-ups became reality. Deviance became politics, politics became deviant. Connections between images of deviance and actual social practices became less coherent, less clear, less persuasive. The media spectacle was taking over at the expense of any dialectic with reality." (1994, pp265-7)

Cohen's role, thus becomes that of an "inchoate" precursor of post-modernism and the very act of bringing together signifier and signified, characteristic of the British work of the period, is seen to be regression rather than progress. There is, of course, much to be said of the notion that the relationship between deviant and reality in the late modern period is distanced, distorted and mediated by the development of the mass media. This, as Sumner recognises, is a major focus of both the work of Stan Cohen and myself at the time. But it is one thing to suggest a process of distancing and misperception occurring within the public sphere and another to suggest that the representation is "cut loose from its moorings" (or indeed that representation has become reality). (See Young, 1981)

Such a radical separation of the deviant from its representation (whether in the mass media or in the discourse of the criminal justice system) makes the mistake of moving from the notion of 'inappropriate' to unrelated, and of believing that there is no dialectic between signified and signifier. The importance of the work centring around the NDC was that it attempted to integrate the two sides of the dyad: action and reaction, signified and signifier, by bring together the two major strands of American theory: that focussing on subculture and that focussing on labelling. The New Criminology, in particular, was explicitly critical of

the attempt to eliminate the interplay between the levels:

"In sum, the social reaction revolt against the structuralism of the Mertonian anomie theorists, and the subcultural critics is, for us, an over-reaction. In the study of deviancy as in the study of society at large, what is required is a sociology that combines structure, process and culture in a continuous dialectic." (1973, p171)

It sought to achieve this by teasing out the radical implications of the two strands: subcultural theory with its stress on the endemic nature of crime resulting from the injustice of opportunities within the system, and labelling theory with its focus on the unjust application of the criminal justice system. It coaxed out the inherent radicalness of Merton and Becker from the cosy wraparound of 1960s America and it sought to do so in an overarching analysis which involved a sociology and ontology informed by Marxism. Thus it is a sociology which starts from the: "overall social context of inequalities of power, wealth and authority" which are a product of class relations within industrial societies and which is critical of the very premise of analytical individualism: "the view of man as an atomistic individual, cut off within families or other specific subcultural situations, insulated from the pressures of existence under the prevailing social conditions" (1973, p270). Indeed the major critical thrust of the book is the rejection of analytical individualism whether in its idealist mode, that of neo-classicism, or in its vulgar materialism form, individual positivism. Untrammelled freedom of will or total determinism - both the metaphysic of the law court or of the behavioural "scientist" are rejected. Neither free spirit nor reified thing reflects the human condition. Furthermore, individuals of necessity exist in a social setting, ontologically they re both products and producers of society. Thus, human action is both determined and determining and crime itself: "as an expression of man's situation of constraint within alienating social arrangements - and as in part an attempt (however futile and counterproductive) to overcome them" (Ibid, p274).

Rebels Without Causes

If we examine the formal requirements of theory it is obvious that it is concerned both with the causes of the deviant act and of the social reaction to it. That is a double aetiology of action and reaction to be explained isomorphically, using the same concepts of human nature and social order. And both must be related to the wider social structure. Thus:

"... a relevant theory of deviancy must treat the causal variables - motivation and reaction - as determinate and as part of a total structure of social relationships." (Ibid, p170)

Indeed the critique of labelling theory is based on the fact that it omits the explanation of the wider and immediate origins of the deviant act and concentrates solely on the reaction against it (Ibid, p165). The New Criminology explicitly expands on the notion of relative deprivation as the causes of crime and the breakdown of the meritocratic myth as a prime cause of crime (Ibid, p137). It is, therefore, pointedly against those theorists who, following in the tradition of labelling theory abandon the search for the causal mechanisms which give rise to crime. (Cf Muncie, this volume) That is, in particular, those influenced by social constructionism who not only - as we have seen - bracket off the deviant act from the reaction against it and focus solely on the latter, but suggest that the explanation of crime and deviancy has no ontological validity

For The New Criminology to advocate the causal explanation of crime is scarcely surprising, given that it is a text immersed in a theoretical tradition influenced by Marx and Engels and which develops radical interpretations of Mertonian theory. Yet, of course, the book is scathingly critical of certain types of causal theory. The first two chapters are devoted to demolishing positivist notions of causality which evoke absolute determinacy. That is theories which deny human volition and meaning: those which, in the vernacular of the time, deny the authenticity

of the deviant act. Yet human beings:

"... make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past." (Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte)

Thus to explain the circumstances which lead to crime does not deny human interpretation and voluntarism.

It has become commonplace, however, for some radicals to deny the possibility of ascertaining these causal sequences (See Smart, 1990). Often this is simply based on the confusion arising from misidentifying a critique of positivism as necessitating a denial of causality. But, more often, it is an integral part of the constructionist platform. Namely, that the discourses carried by the criminal justice system and the mass media play the crucial role in the crime problem. That is causality is shifted from crime - as in positivism - to the process of criminalisation rather than to the interaction of both as outlined in the programme of The New Criminology. But to deny that in certain circumstances (eg unemployment, poverty, marginalisation) some (although far from all) individuals are attracted to certain crimes (eg burglary, street robbery, theft) is not only ludicrous but renders ineffective any radical critique of society. It would render the subtle and insidious lines which Elliott Currie and Ian Taylor (both in this volume) trace from market society to crime wave inapplicable and inconsequential. But, more than this, it would suggest that the main source of the problem of crime in society is within the criminal justice system, not in civil society itself. This has serious political consequences. It suggests that the most pressing task should be to do something about the criminal justice system rather than the society which produces crime in the first place. It mirrors the Right's obsession with prisons and police: it grants by default that it is the administration of society not society itself which is the problem.

Thus, it both restricts our immediate strategies and gives us tawdry utopias. However true it is that we should argue for immediate changes in the control of the police and the reduction of the prison population, we should not lose sight of the even more pressing need to make social and economic changes in the situation of those most liable to offend and those most vulnerable as victims (See E. Currie, 1996). To put too great an emphasis on police reform, as for example occurs in some of the most early realist work (eg Lea and Young, 1984; Kinsey et al, 1986) is a failing not so much in terms of the necessity (these reforms are overdue) but emphasis (they are only a small part of the solution).

The solution, for example, to the extraordinarily high black on black crime rates in the United States is not making the judiciary representative of ethnic minorities nor ensuring that those on death row get a fair trial. These are both perfectly laudable, progressive demands - no one who is to the Left of Attila the Hun would disagree with them - but it would not be a solution to the problem. The mortality rate of young black men would still remain similar to that in Bangladesh: the killing fields of Harlem, South Chicago and Watts would continue their macho business unabated even if the ethnic composition of the police perfectly reflected the community and if every trial were as fair as a liberal's conscience. Similarly, there can be no doubt that the struggle to obtain rape trials which do not further victimise the victim is of great importance and the sympathetic dealing of victims by the police is a crucial demand of justice, but the most meticulously sensitive and decent criminal justice system will only make a small impact on the actual rate of rape suffered by the population. Only a change in the attitudes of men and gender relations - matters of civil society not the administration of justice - will achieve this goal.

But these are matters of immediate reforms: what is argued frequently, particularly by abolitionists, is that what is needed is an ideal, some utopian position in order to orientate our long term aims. For

abolitionists this is most frequently the abolition of imprisonment but it often stretches as far as the criminal justice system as a whole (See Mathiesen, 1990; Hulsman, 1986). And in the place of the criminal justice system, alternatives to prison of various sorts are suggested.

There is no doubt that some utopian vision is needed, some critical point by which to judge progress and to gain purchase in our critique of existing social arrangements (See Ian Loader, in this volume). Not to do so creates a radical politics which is technicist, bitty and short-term. There is also little doubt that the reduction of the prison population and the building of alternatives are an important area of struggle. But whereas to focus, for example, on the abolition of prison might seem to be a utopian ideal, in fact it offers no firm position to critique the inequitable social order. We do not want alternative visions of social control but alternative visions of a just society where both the present criminal justice system and alternatives to prison would be rendered unnecessary. Alternatives to prison may be a solution to the prison problem but they certainly are not a solution to the crime problem. For even if we were to grant that acting after rather than before the offence is committed is the best way of containing crime, and that alternatives to prison can effectively rehabilitate offenders, we would still be facing a major error with regards to crime. For the assumption, often explicitly made by the abolitionists (See Mathieson, 1990) is that only a small number of offenders commit a large amount of crime and, furthermore, they inevitably, at some point, come up before the criminal justice system. But there is little evidence for this: domestic violence, rape, sexual assault, (and in the United States even homicide itself) are all serious examples of crime which are widespread and where there is a multitude of offenders. Furthermore, to take less serious offences such as burglary and street robbery, we often have a few offenders at any one time but the personnel change every month. And, of course, there is little evidence that the vast majority of offenders ever come up before the criminal justice system

Conclusion

I have argued that the significance of The New Criminology was that it was a representative of the discourse about crime, deviancy and culture which arose in the late Sixties and early Seventies around the activities of the NDC. Of course there was a wide current of debate but this was not as incoherent as is often suggested (eg Wiles, 1976; Sumner, 1994). With hindsight the common themes and interests become clearer as does the relevance for the present day. The early Seventies represented a turning point in which the former certainties of the post-war settlement became a subject of debate, controversy and ambiguity. In place of absolute values we had pluralism, instead of collective solidity, a culture of individualism; the notion of progress itself became questioned and social identities once bought off the shelf for life became constantly changing and the subject of struggle and creativity. All of these themes were touched upon in the discourse of a fledgling radical criminology and continue to do so today.

In a way the programme of The New Criminology: the need to explain human behaviour in terms of micro-context and the wider social world, to explain human agency and structure, to trace the interaction between those with powerful definitions of situations and those without and to be cognizant of the major structural elements of age, class, gender and ethnicity is obvious, perhaps, to anyone outside of those working in criminology. But the tendency to partiality, to an emphasis on one part of the social process rather than another, for instance to constructions downwards rather than upwards, to gender rather than class etc, is a common problem in any discipline which seeks to explain or discuss human behaviour. In cultural studies, for example, Paul Willis in his incisive Common Culture (1990) criticises the tendency to downplay the production of identity from below. He criticises, amongst other things, the orthodox Gramscian perspective which seeks to explain popular culture too readily as a site of struggle where 'power blocks' maintain

hegemony over the 'popular classes'. Thus, he writes:

"What makes identity 'from below' and 'horizontally' is crucially missing from most accounts of hegemony. Social agents may not be seen as passive bearers but they still have not become more than brightly coloured cardboard cut-outs pasted around the hegemony board game". (OpCit, p157)

And Angie McRobbie deplores the division of labour that has occurred between sociology, which studies youth culture and cultural studies, which deals with texts and meanings, calling for a convergence into an "interactive cultural sociology". Thus she writes:

"What is needed then, in relation to the study of youth ... is a research mode which prioritises multiple levels of experience, including the ongoing relations which connect everyday life with cultural forms. This would be a way of breaking down the division which has emerged between the study of cultural texts and the study of social behaviour and experience." (1994,pp184-5; See also Ferrell and Sanders, 1995)

The work centring around the NDC was concerned with such problems but there is more than this to it. For the emergence of such ideas and sensitivities occurred precisely at the point at which a late modern world was developing. From the late Sixties onwards we encounter a society driven more and more by a culture of individualism, characterised by diversity and a deconstruction of accepted values. Human action, in each and every nook and cranny of the social world is, indeed, more creative. Role-making becomes top of the agenda rather than role-taking and the need to develop an analysis which deals with how people actively create subcultures in response to the diverse predicaments which face them, becomes paramount. And this is true, of course, across the gamut of human behaviour, some of which includes crime as a master status; some where crime and delinquency is peripheral, and of relative unimportance; some where crime and criminology is of no relevance whatsoever. Similarly, in terms of the response of those in control or who are threatened by a world of pluralism and misbehaviour, the problem of

maintaining hegemony becomes daily more precarious and, therefore, our need to explain social reaction the more obvious. It was no accident, for example, that 'moral panic' was conceived as a concept in the early Seventies. It was then that the post-war monolith of modernism, with its absolutist certainties, was failing. Moral panics, like violence, occur not when hegemony is successful but when authority is losing its grip. And, indeed, as Angie MacRobbie and Sarah Thornton (1995) have shown, there was an increase in the production of such panics partly in response to the vociferous developments within proliferating mass media and, in part, because of the increasing difficulties of drawing sharp demarcations between 'normal' and 'distinct' and to make distinctions which are not hotly contested.

It is for these reasons I would contest Colin Sumner's notion that the ideas circulating around the NDC were inchoate and that The New Criminology had little to say on the level of academic discourse - although I thoroughly agree that the book was, as he puts it: "unkempt"!

But he has, perhaps not surprisingly, a different interpretation of events. Rightly, seeing the labelling theory of Howard Becker as the precursor of his constructionist theory of social censure, he rather optimistically views the 'positive' part of Stan Cohen's work as a prelude to his own and Stuart Hall and his colleagues' Policing the Crisis as

"very much a text which openly illustrates all the marks of transition ... from a sociology of deviance to a sociology of social censures." (Ibid, p295)

My own interpretation, as we have seen, is somewhat different; the agenda set up by the NDC was certainly unkempt and the debates ran us ragged, but it was remarkably prescient and it has only been recently, particularly in cultural studies, that parallel agendas are being addressed. In criminology there has been less development partly because of the constructionist turn in radical criminology and sociology of deviance of

the Eighties and Nineties which, whatever its contribution, muted discussion of such matters as aetiology, the micro-context of crime and the ethnography of deviance, and partly because of the rapid and unexpected expansion of conventional criminology which has remained stolidly within its usual habitat of empiricism and technicism.

Colin Sumner notes that The New Criminology should be judged more as a 'political brick' to be thrown through establishment window than as a piece of academic discourse. I like the idea of the brick; it was necessary, then, when positivist notions ruled the roost and empiricism was unchallenged. But how much has changed? If anything the rise of criminology of the new and far right is a step back from the lukewarm multi-factor positivism of the fifties. What are we to make of James Q Wilson and Richard Herrnstein (1994) who adorn their text with those ghastly line drawings of William Sheldon's somatotypes? (The ones we used to show to our students together with Lombrosian heads to amuse them at the beginning of criminology classes). Or, more seriously, of Philippe Rushton (1995) who, in a book strongly endorsed by Hans Eysenck, insists on the racial basis of violent crime, brain size, intelligence and sexual aggression based on the supposed greater environmental challenges which faced the White races as they faced up to the cold North when compared to the Blacks who remained cosseted in Africa? And there he is busy comparing the cranial sizes of 6,325 military personnel by sex, rank and race and the penile sizes of Whites, Blacks and Mongoloids based, surreally on self-report measurements!

Meanwhile, Travis Hirschi and Michael Gottfredson (1990) evolve a form of market positivism which, with stunning illiteracy, claims to be rooted in the work of both Thomas Hobbes and Emile Durkheim (the latter a critic of the former and both with theories totally agin that of control theory). And, of course, Charles Murray has managed to take blaming the victim to its final conclusion by blaming the crime rate on single mothers (with precious little evidence, see Mooney this volume) whilst in The Bell Curve, the best selling social science text of the decade (1994), comes up with the startling conclusion that crime is caused by the world becoming

more complex so that people of low intelligence are finding it increasingly difficult to tell right from wrong. Meanwhile, self-proclaimed radicals parade in the most torturous language 'the dangerous [sic] work' and 'constant flagellation' which the task of deconstruction holds for them ... well we all know how difficult at times it can be to work in a socio-legal studies department.

Perhaps it is time, once again, to break a few windows: there are many more than before, some so occluded that they serve merely to conceal, some so distorted that our images of crime and justice are as unreal as the latest television crime series - some which reflect like a mirror telling us 'reflexively' more about the writer than the real world outside.

FOOTNOTE

(1) The NDC lasted from 1968 to 1979. Altogether there are five volumes of collected papers from the conferences, although many, perhaps the majority, of the papers were published elsewhere:

S Cohen (ed) Images of Deviance (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971) (1968-1970, York)

I Taylor and L Taylors (eds) Politics and Deviance (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972) (1970-1972, York)

R Bailey and J Young (eds) Contemporary Social Problems in Britain (Farnborough: Saxon House, 1973) (1971-1973, York)

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