THE DURKHEIMIAN LEGACY

Subcultural theory, as we have seen, seeks to relate the immediate origins of deviance to its wider origins in the structure and culture of society. In this Chapter I will attempt to sketch such a link between the master institutions of our society and the motivation to deviate. Central to our task is to create a subcultural theory which is capable of dealing with both pluralism and diversity, with subcultures arising throughout the structure along the main social axes of age, class, gender and ethnicity, which caters for both monetary and expressive aspirations and which can deal with both subcultures of deficit contentment and excess. Subcultures evolve everywhere in social structural and locational sites in order to solve problems of aspirations which are thwarted by the perceived problems facing specific social groups. They, by definition, evolve out of existing subcultures which have been generated to attempt tackle past problems. And they, therefore, by necessity, involve an explanation which can relate the micro-situation of the individuals concerned with the macro-situation of the wider social structure. The sociological tradition is rich in insights with regards to such a task: in particular the work of what is rather simplistically called the anomie school stretching from Durkheim, through Merton, Cloward and Ohlin to present-day subcultural theorists. Let us first examine the anomie school attempting to caution against these commentators who see not a linear tradition, but a series of disparate and radical breaks, and against those theorists who would collapse the theory of anomie to its very opposite, an explanation based on the simple lack of social regulation, namely, the control theory of Travis Hirschi.

ANOMIE AND RELATIVE DEPRIVATION: THE CAREER OF A CONCEPT

Of all theories which have been influential in explaining the social causation of crime and deviant behaviour anomie theory is paramount. For it is anomie theory which attempts to pinpoint the genesis of crime and deviance in the dominant ethos and structure of society and in the fundamental contradictions which exist within the social
order. However, there has been, over the years, a considerable narrowing of its conception, a focus on the explanation of lower working class crime to the exclusion of crime throughout the structure and the repeated loss of human subjectivity, particularly in those instances where anomie or 'strain' theory as it has become known, is operationalised and tested against various data bases. (See, for example, Blau and Blau, 1982; Messner, 1982; Bailey, 1984).

Strain theory has the following attributes:

i) it stresses relative, not absolute, deprivation

ii) it views the strain of thwarted aspirations to be unequivocally greatest in the lower part of the class structure

iii) it sees crime as a result of this, either remedying this 'deficit' by providing goods illegitimately or as the result of expressive rage at the lack of wealth.

As such it has set itself up as a target like a clay pigeon in a shooting match. Thus contemporary critics such as Goffredson and Hirschi (1990) and Wilson and Herrnstein (1986) point repeatedly to:

i) its inability to explain middle class crime

ii) the law-abiding nature of much lower class life

iii) the lack of high aspirations to be thwarted in lower class individuals

iv) the inability of such crime to remedy the supposed deficit

It is not that contemporary strain theorists have failed to touch upon the problems of lower class life and the relationship of these to criminality, it is that they have touched upon it with a positivistic brush, painting a picture which is heavy-handedly deterministic. Indeed, their approach allows the critics of the right to portray them, quite correctly, as the modern exemplar of sociological positivism. For example, their conception of relative deprivation does not embrace the notion of the conscious actor experiencing deprivation, rather it is simply the determined response to relative
inequalities in society. It involves seeking correlations between income inequality in a society and criminal behaviour. This is not a process of experienced injustice, it is one of objective injustice. It does not actually replace absolute deprivation with relative deprivation, it replaces it with something which one might call 'absolute relative deprivation', that is deprivation measured in absolute terms as objective differentials in income and wealth.

It is the task of this chapter to attempt to rescue concepts of anomie and relative deprivation from such a charge of sociological positivism, a strand of thought which ironically all of the major theorists in this tradition set out to oppose. In the process it seeks to elaborate the links between anomie and relative deprivation theory which has not been adequately spelt out, whilst making apparent the links between anomie theory and contemporary critical theory - for example - the work of Jurgen Habermas and Claus Offe - which also focus on the relationship between social contradictions and human motivation, have simply not been explored.

DURKHEIM: THE ANOMIE OF THE ADVANTAGED AND DISADVANTAGED

I wish to explore Durkheim's concept of anomie in depth, extensively quoting from his work, because this is rich vein to explore in terms of understanding the relationship between society and the individual, but also because this allows an examination of the contesting claims of lineage by strain theory and control theory. In doing so I wish to underscore my critique of contemporary strain theory as a debased positivistic form of anomie theory and point to the central tenets of control theory as being directly contrary to the anomie tradition.

Durkheim was writing in the midst of the rapid industrialization of French society. From his birth in 1858 to his death in 1917 he witnessed a massive transformation of the social structure and in the prevailing ethos: in particular the rise of individualism and the decline of traditional values. Intellectually, the major thrust of Durkheim's work is against such individualism, both as a mode of analysing society and as a basis of political order. Analytical individualism, whether it is the attempt to explain social action
as a function of biological propensity (individual positivism) or as the result of freely engaged relationships entered into by atomized individuals (social contract theories based on utilitarianism), are systematically criticized. (See Taylor, Walton and Young, 1973, pp.67-74). Furthermore, it is argued that utilitarianism cannot be the basis for a stable social order. For, as Giddens observed in his commentary on Durkheim: "utilitarian theory gives prominence to the emergence of individualism, but mistakenly attempts to formulate an abstract social theory on this basis: in fact, a society composed of egoistic or self-seeking, individuals would be no society at all." (1972, p.2). "One has an easy time", writes Durkheim, "in denouncing as an ideal without grandeur this shabby commercialism which reduces society to the status of a vast apparatus of production and exchange" (1898, p.7). One does not have to travel far in this present period to find the re-emergence of such notion that a stable society can be based on atomized individuals without an overarching morality. Or, as Margaret Thatcher put it: "There is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women and there are families." (quoted in the Observer, 1 November, 1988).

Durkheim charts in *The Division of Labour* the transition from mechanical to organic solidarity. This, of necessity, involves a process of individuation: of the individual casting aside the tyranny of the group and developing his or her talents to the full. The fault of the emerging social order is that such individuation becomes a rampant individualism - a cult of the individual - where there is no agreed moral order with agreement as to just rewards and where individuals compete unfairly in an unequal society (see Giddens, 1972, p.11). There is both a lack of regulation and norms themselves which exhort individualism at the expense of the collective good.

Durkheim's conception of anomie is frequently caricatured as a state of normlessness, where the innate biological impulses of man lacking social regulation give rise to inevitable deviancy:

"Unlike Durkheim, Merton did not consider man's biological nature to be important in explaining deviation: what Durkheim considered the innate
desires of man, such as ambition to achieve unattainable objects, Merton felt were induced by the social structure... [His] idea of the nature of man, while questionable, reflected the prevailing view of the time that man was filled with certain innate desires which needed to be fulfilled and that society either restrained or encouraged them." (M Clinard, 1964, pp.11 and 7)

Such a view, although mooted in some of Durkheim’s minor works (eg E Durkheim, 1964) is hardly credible if one examines his most notable discussion of the concept of anomie in *Suicide*. Here the fully social origins of the deviant impulse are made clear. (*vide* A Giddens, 1971 and 1972). For he clearly states that the organic needs of human beings are, by their very nature, satiable and limited: it is his *socially induced* aspirations which are potentially without limit.

"In the animal, at least in a normal condition,... equilibrium is established with automatic spontaneity because the animal depends on purely material conditions. All the organism needs is that the supplies of substance and energy constantly employed in the vital process should be periodically renewed by equivalent quantities; that replacement be equivalent to use. When the void created by existence in its own resources is fulled, the animal, satisfied, asks nothing further. Its power of reflection is not sufficiently developed to imagine other ends than those implicit in its physical nature"....

"This is not the case with man, because most his needs are not dependent on his body or not to the same degree. Strictly speaking, we may consider that the quantity of material supplies necessary to the physical maintenance of a human life is subject to computation, though this be less exact than in the preceding case and a wider margin left for the free combinations of the will; for beyond the indispensable minimum which satisfies nature when instinctive, a more awakened reflection suggests better conditions, seemingly desirable ends craving fulfilment. Such appetites, however, admittedly sooner or later reach a limit which they cannot pass. But how determine the quantity of well-being, comfort or luxury legitimately to be craved by a human being? Nothing appears in man’s organic nor in his psychological constitution which sets a limit to such tendencies. The functioning of individual life does not require them to cease at one point rather than at another; the proof being that they have constantly increased since the beginnings of history, receiving more
and more complete satisfaction, yet with no weakening of average health. Above all, how establish their proper variation with different conditions of life, occupations, relative importance of services, etc? In no society are they equally satisfied in the different stages of the social hierarchy. Yet human nature is substantially the same among all men, in its essential qualities. It is not human nature which can assign the variable limits necessary to our needs." (1952, pp.246-7)

He distinguishes two forms of anomie which I will term the _anomie of injustice_ and the _anomie of the advantaged_

(a) **Anomie of Injustice**

"The well-regulated society is one where the collective conscience assigns each person a place within society commensurate with his or her merit and to each position a just reward. However, at certain times such a balance of justice does not hold sway. A major impediment in modern societies is the hereditary nature of property and thus life-chance, so that merit cannot find its appropriate level within society." *(vide E Durkheim, 1952, p.251; 1964, pp.375-378)*

All societies have a notion of differential rewards: "the relative award due to each, and the consequent degree of comfort appropriate on the average to workers in each occupation. The differential functions are graded in public opinion and a certain coefficient of well-being assigned to each, according to its place in the hierarchy." (1952, p.249). But, he continues:

"It would be of little use for everyone to recognize the justice of the hierarchy of functions established by public opinion, if he did not also consider the distribution of these functions just. The workman is not in harmony with his social position if he is not convinced that he has his deserts. If he feels justified in occupying another, what he has would not satisfy him. So it is not enough for the average level of needs for each social condition to be regulated by public opinion, but another, more precise rule, must fix the way in which these conditions are open to individuals." (1952, p.250).

And he points to such a disjunction occurring because of a disparity between aptitude and merit on the one hand and the actual
distribution of rewards on the other. For, as Frank Pearce points out in *The Radical Durkheim*: "The institutions of inherited wealth create a gap between the needs of the social order, its legitimations and the actual experience of its subjects, subverting the possibility that they could make a *rational* commitment to the social order." Indeed: "Society as a whole will only be solidaristic if any hierarchically stratified positions are, in both principle and practice, filled by meritocratic recruitment. This is the only way that the energy of individuals is likely to be used constructively, since only then will they fulfil their occupational role enthusiastically." (1989, pp.78 and 76. (See also Giddens, 1972, p.11).

Now this analysis by Durkheim is remarkable in that it contains the essence of the notion of contradiction between available opportunities and individual merit, which is grounded in a society based on inherited wealth. It has the notion of relative reward - a clear precursor of relative deprivation theory - and it stresses that it is not the absence of distributive norms but the *justice* of their distribution which is important. As he notes elsewhere, in *The Division of Labour,:* "it is not enough for there to be rules, however, for sometimes the rules themselves are what is at fault." (Giddens, 1972, p.179)

And, indeed, under these conditions people are justified in entering into a conflict so as to change the opportunity structure. It is this 'functional rebel' who expresses more clearly the 'true' collective conscience which is in the process of emerging, than those who merely conform to the existing mores. (Richter, 1964; Taylor, Walton and Young, 1973)

(b) *The Anomie of the Advantaged*
Whereas the anomie of injustice refers to realistic aspirations (in terms of merit) faced with inequitable opportunities, the anomie of the advantaged is concerned with unrealistic and unlimited aspirations. Durkheim’s critique is of a utilitarian morality which encourages unrestrained self-seeking and which has no meaningful endpoint nor any substantial or tangible object:

"From top to bottom of the ladder, greed is aroused without knowing where to find ultimate foothold. Nothing can calm it, since its goal is far beyond all it can attain. Reality seems valueless by comparison with the dreams of feverished imaginations; reality is therefore abandoned, but so too is possibility when it in turn becomes reality. A thirst arises for novelties, unfamiliar pleasures, nameless sensations, all of which lose their savor once known." (1952, p.256)

And it is those high in the class structure who are most affected, for:

"at least the horizon of the lower classes is limited by those above them, and for this same reason their desires are more modest. Those who have only empty space above them are almost inevitably lost in it, if no force restrains them." (Ibid, p.257)

But what is the nature of this force? Whereas the human organism has easily recognized limits, the human individual has no such inherent limits of desire. Thus:

"since the individual has no way of limiting them, this must be done by some force exterior to him. A regulative force must play the same role for moral needs which the organism plays for physical needs. This means that the force can only be moral. The awakening of conscience interrupted the state of equilibrium of the animal’s dormant existence; only conscience, therefore, can furnish the means to re-establish it. Physical restraint would be ineffective; hearts cannot be touched by physio-chemical forces. So far as the appetites are not automatically restrained by physiological mechanisms, they can be halted only by a limit that they recognize as just." (Ibid, pp.248-9)

It is the absence of such normative limits which ascertain the
distribution of rewards and grant those rewards a meaning and a finite quality anomie ensures, not only within the mass of society but at its very peak. But such aspirations are not inherent in human nature, what is inherent is the inability to find a sense of well-being satisfaction outside of a justly agreed social consensus. They are not a product of simply taking the lid off human desire, but rather of values which extol the limitlessness of aspiration. An ethos where: "the longing for infinity is daily represented as a mark of moral distinction." (Ibid, p.257)

But where do such values come from? Durkheim clearly located their origin in the changing structure and tempo of society:

"Ultimately, this liberation of desires has been made worse by the very development of industry and the almost infinite extension of the market. So long as the producer could gain his profits only in his immediate neighborhood, the restricted amount of possible gain could not much overexcite ambition. Now that he may assume to have almost the entire world as his customer, how could passions accept their former confinement in the face of such limitless prospects?

Such is the source of the excitement predominating in this part of society, and which has thence extended to the other parts. There the state of crisis and anomy is constant and, so to speak, normal." (Ibid, p.256)

Thus if the anomie of the disadvantaged is located in the changing structure of society to which there is no agreed distribution of rewards, the anomie of the advantaged, which subsequently extends throughout society, has origins in the rapid expansion of markets and technological development.

Quite clearly, Durkheim cites the sources of discontent in the ethos of individualism and in the contradictions of merit and opportunity
that society engenders - although the two types of anomie are not fully integrated. Furthermore, despite the fact that such 'strain' is seen to be greatest at the bottom of society and at the top, such influences are acknowledged as occurring throughout the social structure. Lastly, Durkheim refers both to the problem of rewards which are not commensurate with merit, and of rewards which are incessantly shifting. That is, with the problem of just rewards - with presumably a reasonably fixed and agreed nature - and that of rewards which, once achieved, become insubstantial and lead to an everlasting pursuit of the new. Nor, one should add, are these thwarted aspirations limited to monetary considerations, the 'thirst for novelties, unfamiliar pleasures, nameless sensations' scarcely limits itself to worries about financial reward.

Anomie as a Simple Lack of Regulation: Is Durkheim a Control Theorist?
I have stressed, up until now, the emphasis in Durkheim's writing as the social causes of discontent: on the influence of culture - the cult of the individual, and on the contradiction between culture and structure - meritocratic individualism confronting hereditary privilege. But, there is a third strand in his writing which suggests that discontent is a product of deregulation: of the simple lack of norms prevalent in a society undergoing change. He portrays this occurring particularly at times of great change: which can occur both at times of economic disaster and where there is abrupt growth of power and wealth. In the latter instance:

"as the conditions of life are changed, the standard according to which needs were regulated can no longer remain the same; for it varies with social resources, since it largely determines the share of each class of producers. The scale is upset; but a new scale cannot be immediately improvised."
Time is required for the public conscience to reclassify men and things. So long as the social forces thus freed have not regained equilibrium, their respective values are unknown and so all regulation is lacking for a time. The limits are unknown between the possible and the impossible, what is just and what is unjust, legitimate claims and hopes and those which are immoderate. Consequently, there is no restraint upon aspirations. If the disturbance is profound, it affects event he principles controlling the distribution of men among various occupations. Since the relations between various parts of society are necessarily modified, the ideas expressing these relations must change. Some particular class especially favored by the crisis is no longer resigned to its former lot, and, on the other hand, the example of its greater good fortune arouses all sorts of jealousy below and about it. Appetites, not being controlled by a public opinion become disoriented, no longer recognize the limits proper to them. With increased prosperity desires increase. At the very moment when traditional rules have lost their authority, the richer prize offered these appetites stimulates them and makes them more exigent and impatient of control." (Ibid, p.253)

Note, for a moment, that Durkheim sees anomie as occurring not only to both rich and poor, but in times of rapid increase in prosperity and in those of recession. But, to pursue my point, there is no doubt that he refers in this passage primarily to deregulation per se as distinct from the socially induced experiences of injustice or of limitless ends described earlier.

It is such passages which allow David Downes and Paul Rock to characterize Durkheim as an intellectual precursor of control theory and to
bracket him with Hobbes: "Control theories have a formidable pedigree. They can be traced back through Durkheim to Hobbes and to Aristotle." (1998, p.235) It allows the authors of a recent textbook on criminology to come out with the astonishing pronouncement:

"The origins of contemporary control theories of crime and delinquency are to be found in part in the work of the French sociologist, Emile Durkheim....[this] viewpoint was deeply affected by his conception of human nature. According to his homo duplex conception, any person was a blend of two aspects. On one side there was the social self, the aspect of self which looks to society and is a product of socialization and cultivation of human potentials - the 'civilised' member of a community. On the other side there was the egotistical self, the primal self which is incomplete without society, and which is full of impulses knowing no natural limits. This conception of the primal aspect is somewhat similar to Freud's notion of the id." (Lilly et al, 1989, pp.84-86).

And, indeed, Travis Hirschi himself proclaims: "Because Merton traces his intellectual history to Durkheim, strain theories are often called 'anomie' theories. Actually Durkheim's theory is one of the purest examples of control theory: both anomie and egoism are conditions of 'deregulation' and the 'aberrant' behaviour that follows is an automatic consequence of such deregulation" (1969, p.3 nl). Durkheim thus becomes at one with those who believe that delinquency is simply something that erupts when the lid is taken off, that, as Hobbes put it: "why do obey the rules of society? ... Of all the passions, that which inclineth men least to break the laws, is fear" (1957, p.195) and to concur with Hirschi when he states that "the question is not 'why do they do it? it is: 'Why don't we do it?' There is much evidence that we would if we dared." (1969, p.34)
Such an identification of Durkheim with Hobbes and the claims that he is the forebear of Hirschi, is a calumny. As far as human nature is concerned we have already seen how he rejected the notion of the homo duplex. Indeed, how much clearer could he be? In terms of social order Durkheim, in *The Rules of Sociological Method*, explicitly criticizes Hobbes (and Rousseau).

"For some authors, such as Hobbes and Rousseau, there is a break in continuity between the individual and society. Man is thus naturally refractory to social life; he can only resign himself to it when forced. Social ends are not simply the convergence of individual ends; they are, rather, contrary to them. Thus, to induce the individual to pursue them, it is necessary to constrain him; and the task of society consists above all in the institution and organisation of this constraint. Since, however, the individual is regarded as the sole reality of the human realm, this organisation, whose only object is to hinder and confine him, can only be conceived as artificial. It is not founded in nature, since it is designed to restrict it, by preventing it from producing antisocial consequences. It is a human creation, a mechanism constructed entirely by hand of man, which, like all products of this kind, is only what it is because men have willed it so. A decree of the will created it: another can transform it. Neither Hobbes nor Rousseau seems to have realised how contradictory it is to admit that the individual is himself the author of a machine which has for its essential role his domination and constraint; or at least, it seemed to them sufficient for this contradiction to disappear that it be disguised in the eyes of those who are its victims, by the clever artifice of the social contract." (Giddens, 1972, pp.99-100)
For Durkheim human beings are social, the desires of their biology are satiable and limited, the desires engendered by society are variable and potentially unlimited. But the relationship between the individual and society is not that of a social template transfixing a passive imprint. The individual stands back from the social order and assesses the justice of the existing division of labour and rewards. His or her acceptance of the social order is not achieved by a coercive social contract as envisaged by Hobbes. Nor is it achieved by a fake consensus, a return to traditional values of self-control and acquiescence as envisaged by those on the right of which Travis Hirschi is merely a more recent example. For, unless the individual accepts the normative 'lid' as just, the lid will be constantly tilted. The impulse to deviate is not given in the unconstrained individual, but a product of the individual assessing his or her constraints. But a final model remains, that of the market and unrestrained competition: a consensus constructed out of individualism. Here the competition will remain unequal, the social fabric will become anarchic, and even the successful fail to find rest or satisfaction. The impulsiveness which leads to the anti-social becomes a social value itself. It is here, as Le Capra suggests: "Durkheim's concept of anomie situated Hobbes's defiantly defensive and power-hungry man as a personality type within a specific pathological state of society. Hobbesian man did not represent 'human nature', but only one pathological possibility of human nature which emerged in an anomic state of society." (1972, p.160). The answer, therefore, to Hirschi's: "Why don't we do it"? and, "Would we do it if we dared"? is that in an unequal society many do, indeed, dare and that this daringness is exacerbated by a society which sets great value on daring, risk-taking and individualism. And there is a natural progression here, uncharted by Durkheim, which is the extent to which people, disenchanted by a world where social justice is palpably not in evidence, turn readily to values which extol unrestrained individualism. For what else is there? In an unfair society it is, after all, every man for himself.
Justified discontent boils over into an individualism which, both legally and illegally, compounds injustice.

It is the existence or absence of just rules which generate compliance or deviance; it is rules which exhort solidarity or individualism which enhance or disrupt social order. The simplistic portrayed of social order in control theory which envisages conformity and deviance as predicated on the presence and level of adherence of individuals to social norms forgets the assessment of individuals of the justice of these norms and the content of the norms themselves.

But let us return to Durkheim's notion of lack of regulation. Paramountly, it must be seen in the context of rapid change (see Rock, 1997). Public opinion, with its classification of the just reward for a particular occupational task, has not been able to reconstitute itself in the face of dramatic changes, either of prosperity or recession, in the structure of society. This is scarcely a contradiction to the major thrust of Durkheim's work, which, as we have seen, stresses the social causes of anomie, it refers chiefly to the incongruence between norms and rewards in times of rapid social change. But it is not an either-or: either anomie is socially constructed, or is a result of a lack of social construction. For, despite Durkheim's emphasis on change, there is much to suggest that such a state of deregulation is more than a temporary feature of moments of crisis. Sometimes discussion of this revolves around his distinction between egoism and anomie; for example, in Parson's *The Structure of Social Action*. Indeed, there has been a continual debate as to the unitary or distinctive nature of these concepts (see Lukes, 1975; Johnson, 1965). But the differences between the concepts are often confused and shifting in Durkheim's writing. Rather than indulge in a Talmudic textual debate it is better to distil what is conceptually useful whilst retaining the spirit of his work. More importantly, a unified theory of crime must acknowledge that the motivation for crime occurs in social situations which involve vastly different levels of social
control. The stark contrast which Travis Hirschi (1969) makes between control and strain theory does not correspond to reality. It repeats the partiality prevalent in so many debates in criminology. We can, therefore, fruitfully distinguish three forms of anomie in Durkheim: that which involves the content of norms (whether assessed as just or unjust); that which involves the form of norms (whether individualistic or solidaristic); and that which involves the presence of norms (whether existent or absent). They share a common grounding for, as Le Capra puts it: "In terms of Durkheim's formulation, the cases of normlessness, normative contradiction and normatively constrained or praised limitlessness shared the irrational quality of an institutionally grounded sense of legitimate limits which was essential for reciprocity and solidarity (1972, p.165 n19). They represent, therefore, a crisis of legitimacy in the system and a motivation crisis for the individual.

The Durkheimian Legacy

We are now in a position to summarize the key contributions of Durkheim to the anomie tradition and the subcultural theorization which grew out of it:

1. The Relationship to the Economic Sphere
   He saw sources of discontent both in the 'forced' division of labour where occupational roles and rewards are not allocated by merit and aptitude, and in the individualistic values themselves generated in the sphere of the economy. Market relations are, thus, the causal basis of his analysis.

2. The Social Basis of Discontent
   He pinpointed the source of discontent as within society - both its economic and cultural structure - not within the biological tendencies of the individual. It is ironic that a theorist who argued that the biological could only fix the limits of organic satiation and that these were strictly demarcated, should be portrayed as locating insatiable aspirations in the sphere of biology. It is the inability of human
biology to fix limits and the infinite flexibility of society to raise them rather than the reverse which is the crux of the matter. For, if biology were paramount, there would, in fact, be little problem of anomie.

3. **The Content of Norms**
He viewed the contradiction between hereditary privilege and opportunity based on merit, as a potent source of discontent. The notion of blocked mobility, of lack of opportunities and of unfair conditions of competition in the Labour market is, therefore, stressed.

4. **The Form of Norms**
He pointed to the individualism engendered by the market as undermining social order and generating discontent in that such values provide no finite and satisfactory end. The effect of culture is thus stressed, although the cult of individualism is grounded in the economy.

5. **The Presence of Norms**
He indicated that rapid social and economic change created situations where there was no agreement as to the distribution of rewards and a state of simple de-regulation occurred.

6. **The Relative Nature of Discontent**
He was acutely aware that feelings of discontent and satisfaction were not related to absolute levels of wealth, but were *relative* to the consensus of opinion as to place of a particular occupation in the hierarchy. But he adds to this the important proviso that it is not the existence of rules but rules which are seen as meritocratic that ensures their legitimacy.

7. **The Conscious Actor**
Throughout Durkheim stresses the individual assessing the justice of rules and of his or her position in the hierarchy. There is no sense of the social actor being a deterministic product of rules or the lack of them, as in sociological positivism.

8. **The Timing of Discontent**
Durkheim pinpoints times of rapid increase in prosperity and economic crisis as the occasions when there is the greatest level of anomie. This being said, his critique of the ethos of individualism and of an unmeritocratic society hinges around the need to develop a solidaristic social order. In the absence of such social change anomie would undoubtedly remain and be a normal feature of industrial societies.

9. **The Distribution of Discontent**
Anomie is seen as occurring both amongst the advantaged and the disadvantaged. Thus the ethos of individualism is seen to percolate down throughout society, although there is greatest disorientation amongst those high in the social order, whilst the anomie of blocked opportunities is, of course, greatest in those without significant inherited wealth.

10. **The Shape of Discontent**
Although there is no clear linkage between anomie and particular forms of deviance, Durkheim, of course, does not limit his discussion to outcomes of an instrumental criminal nature. Suicide, rebellion, expressive crimes and the deviance of excess are all hinted at or delineated.

This, therefore, is the Durkheimian legacy. It is work that attempts to connect the economic conditions of society to its moral climate. It is not, as
in the case of control theory, a work of disconnection. It questions both available means and ends in terms of the legitimacy of the system and the crisis of motivation of the social actors within it. It is critical not only of the lack of opportunities within the social structure, but of the culture itself. There is evident the presence of the conscious actor and the beginnings of relative deprivation theory. Durkheim's formulations do not restrict themselves to the lower point of the class structure, but anomie is present throughout, although to varying degrees. Discontent is present, both at times of prosperity and in recession. Durkheim would, therefore, not face the conundrum of sociological positivism with regards to middle class deviancy nor an aetiological crisis when confronting crime rises rapidly in times of affluence. He would have discontent occurring, both because of deficit amongst the unsuccessful, and arising from ends which, once achieved, are experienced as deficient by the successful. There are many omissions, of course. There is no sense of pluralism, the relationship between discontent and particular forms of deviance is not spelt out; various modes of accommodation to inequality are missing and the intermediate institutions, gearing between social values and the individual, are absent. Much of this is remedied in later anomie theory and many of these problems are still to be tackled satisfactorily, but the theoretical insights which Durkheim has provided are a rich vein and their recapitulation - a vital necessity if we are to build a fully social, subcultural theory.